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the conditions for IP marketplaces to work effi ciently and be sustainable in the long run. While mainstream economics argues that knowledge privatisation is necessary in order to remedy the market failure connected with the inherently public nature of knowledge (what has been termed the "tragedy of the commons"), this article addresses a different kind of market failure: the failure of institutions to ensure the effi cient functioning of the markets for knowledge-based goods (what we can term a "tragedy of institutions").
This approach is in line with the tradition of institutional economics, where it is argued that markets are platforms
The intellectual property rights regime plays a particularly important role for the pharmaceutical industry with its extensive efforts in research and development and for the protection of newly generated knowledge. It is, however, well recognised that firms do not patent or copyright mainly to cover R&D expenditures, as suggested in mainstream intellectual property rights (IPR) theory, but rather that their incentives are related to various types of strategic value they can obtain through licensing markets or via buying and selling such IPR, i.e. by engaging in the marketplaces for intellectual property (IP).
1
IP marketplaces are the focus of this article. We deal with different kinds of IP marketplaces as institutions and explore the incentives for firms to participate in these marketplaces in terms of the strategic benefits that they seek. We also investigate the IP governance forms that firms employ to realise this value and the problems or obstacles they face in this process.
Despite the existence of research that points to the IPR marketplace as a platform for value creation, 2 the theoretical and empirical IPR literature has focused very little, if at all, on the functioning and effi ciency of the IPR marketplace per se. Our research intends to contribute to fi lling this gap by focusing on the pharmaceutical industry as a promising case to research Birgitte Andersen,* Federica Rossi** and Johannes Stephan***
Intellectual Property Marketplaces and How They Work: Evidence from German Pharmaceutical Firms
This article examines a sample of German pharmaceutical fi rms to highlight the strategic reasons why fi rms participate in various intellectual property (IP) marketplaces, both proprietary (patents and copyrights) and non-proprietary (open source and non-patented technology). The obstacles that prevent these marketplaces from functioning effi ciently are also investigated. The analysis suggests that IP policy must embrace all IP forms and must recognise that IP marketplaces do not work "automatically" but suffer many institutional failures.
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ing the processes of creating and distributing value. 4 In doing so, it incorporates the theoretical framework for the productive potential of IPR (set out in Andersen and Konzelmann) 5 where the focus is on the "institutional environment", on the "institutions of governance" and on the interaction of the two in infl uencing value creation and value distribution from IP.
Second, the article challenges the mainstream view that knowledge privatisation, normally attached to a patent, is necessary in order to remedy the market failure connected to the inherently public nature of knowledge, since it researches value creation processes in marketplaces associated with several forms of IP, both proprietary (patents, copyrights) and non-proprietary (open source, IP with no formal protection). 6 Previously, patent studies have dominated this research fi eld.
Third, the article applies the concept of institutional failure, as introduced by institutional economists, 7 to IP marketplaces, investigating the possible sources of such failures when IP marketplaces do not work or underperform.
Finally, the choice of IP governance forms within each IP marketplace (see Table 1 for an overview) is investigated in relation to the performance of IP markets, a technique that, to our knowledge, has not previously been considered.
The empirical analysis sheds new light on the relationship between the fi rms' objectives when trading IP and their choice of marketplaces and governance forms, thus enhancing our understanding of the rationale for these institutions to exist. It also focuses on the obstacles that prevent IP marketplaces from functioning smoothly and points to some critical issues that policymakers need to be aware of if such obstacles are to be removed. A. B i r e c r e e , S. K o n z e lm a n n , F. W i l k i n s o n : Productive systems, competitive pressures, strategic choices and work organisation: an introduction, in: International Contributions to Labour Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1997, pp. 3-17. 5 B. A n d e r s e n , S. K o n z e l m a n n , op. cit.. 6 The terms "proprietary" and "non-proprietary" become popular in relation to software, but they are now used more broadly across various industries. We defi ne as "proprietary" those forms of IP protection where restrictions on using, sharing, copying and modifying intellectual property are implemented by legal means, while non-proprietary IP is characterised by the relaxation of some or all of these restrictions. of social relations and cannot be reduced to simple supply and demand curves. For trade to take place, these social relations need to be underpinned by trust and similar expectations between buyers and sellers in relation to prices, contracts and other aspects. 3 We refer to the notion of "marketplace" to denote the space, actual or metaphorical, in which a market operates, and hence to emphasise the web of social relationships and institutions that are required for processes of exchange to take place.
By researching the functioning and effi ciency of IP marketplaces, we are able to look in more detail at markets as institutions for value creation and at the potential sources of institutional failure.
The empirical analysis presented in this article is based upon an original exploratory survey of a sample of pharmaceutical fi rms based in Germany. The questionnaire concerned the fi rms' IP exchange activities and the strategic benefi ts fi rms seek from them, the obstacles they experience in IP marketplaces, as well as some information on ways in which prices are set in the patent and copyright marketplaces and on the perceived "value vs. price" relationship. Further details on the sample and on the data collection process are presented below.
The article is structured as follows. First, we set the general analytical framework by briefl y introducing proprietary and non-proprietary IP marketplaces, covering what they are and how they work. We then broadly review the strategic benefi ts that fi rms may seek from trading their IP in various marketplaces, and the institutional obstacles which they may face during these activities and which may affect their individual performance as well as the performance of entire IP systems. After outlining the data on which the empirical analysis is based, we present our results. Finally, we offer conclusions on the performance and effi ciency of IP marketplaces as experienced by the set of survey respondents in the German pharmaceutical industry.
The analysis presented in this article expands the existing literature in several ways. First, it builds upon "productive systems" theory, which argues that the requirements for operational and dynamic effi ciencies, and hence system performance, depend upon the ability to secure effective cooperation among stakeholders within the system dur- Many fi rms also exchange non-protected technology in IP marketplaces. An explanation for this could be that the patent system is too resource-demanding in terms of application costs, search costs in order to avoid duplication of an invention and enforcement costs regarding possible court cases. Alternatively, it could be that the technological solution is not at the forefront from a technical point of view (thereby failing to satisfy the novelty criteria for patent protection), but it is still very productive for industry and therefore traded in the market. The reason could also be that the innovation is diffi cult to understand and imitate, or that it is client-specifi c and irrelevant to other fi rms, or that the inventor or innovator enjoys a fi rst-mover advantage, thus rendering moot whether or not the technology is protected. Finally, it could be due to the fact that the technology product life-cycle is short, making it reasonable to launch the unprotected technology on the market, as the patent system is too slow.
Secondly, this article investigates the reasons why fi rms engage in different types of IP marketplaces and why they use specifi c IP governance structures. Andersen and Konzelmann 11 suggest that the choice of a governance structure underpinning an IP marketplace is not random; rather, it depends upon the type of fi nancial and non-fi nancial value that the stakeholders seek to realise: in other words, they suggest that there is a relationship between the choice of a certain IP governance institution within a specifi c IP marketplace and the benefi ts fi rms seek to achieve from the transaction. This is investigated through the following research questions: 
Proprietary and Non-Proprietary IP Marketplaces as Institutions
The institutional economics literature 8 argues that there is not only one market, as standard textbook theory postulates, but that there are many different types of markets (for example auction markets, price tag markets, medieval-style regional street markets, black or unauthorised markets), and that these markets are enforced by different norms and bargaining forms. This also applies to intellectual property. In this paper we consider several IP marketplaces, which are best distinguished by the character of the knowledge that is exchanged. The various IP marketplaces are underpinned by different social relations, as defi ned by the IP governance structures (see Table 1 ). The quality of the social relations are infl uenced by the different types of institutional failures (see below). With regard to proprietary IP marketplaces -patent and copyright -Andersen and Konzelmann 9 outline different forms of market platforms where IPR can be exchanged. They also explain how these markets are embedded in various social relations as defi ned by different IPR governance structures, ranging from simple arrangements (buying and selling, licensing in and out) to more complex ones such as cross-licensing and pooling. Such forms of patent and copyright interactions are not expected to be exclusive; rather, most fi rms would presumably participate in several different forms.
With regard to non-proprietary IP marketplaces, the most common model is open source. Whereas IPR law in its current form provides the right to exclude anyone from using, modifying and redistributing copies of an author's work, as well as a right to withhold the source-code, a "GNU General Public License (GPL)" transfers these rights to the commons in order to ensure access, i.e. to ensure that every person who receives a copy of a work When discussing the obstacles to the smooth functioning of IP marketplaces, institutional economics tends to focus on asymmetric relationships with respect to bargaining power and information and knowledge. 17 Trust is also an important factor in market interaction. 18 But there are also other institutional aspects of markets as platforms for social relations, which could affect the sustainability of the system. For example, a recent report from the software industry, 19 which focused especially on patent rights, suggested that fi rms encountered problems relating to (i) infl exibility (impossible to bargain a deal), (ii) a lack of transparency (diffi cult to identify the owner, uncertainty as to what the right price is, or impossible to make sense of text and diagrams in patent documents), (iii) a lack of integrity (poor behaviour and unjust court cases), and (iv) low quality (too many similar patents with no inventive step), among other obstacles. To understand the problems that fi rms encounter when engaging in IP marketplaces which can lead to institutional failure, we investigated several main categories of obstacles derived from the literature, namely problems relating to diffi culties in search, lack of transparency, contract design and enforcement issues and regulation issues. The range of obstacles investigated by the survey is listed at the end of the data section.
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Data
This study draws upon the UKNOW-survey database comprising data collected from German pharmaceutical 
RQ2: What are the various types of strategic benefi ts or the value that fi rms seek when exchanging IP? RQ3: Is there a relationship between benefi t seeking and the choice of governance forms?
Building upon the relevant literature on the use of IP marketplaces that has been developed in relation to patents, we explore in particular the following four main categories of strategic benefi ts that can be sought through participation in IP marketplaces and which represent the most widely cited reasons that fi rms engage in the exchange of IP:
benefi ts relating to innovation, in that the trade of IP • should facilitate innovation diffusion 12 and enhance innovation processes, often in a social process of interaction with other individuals and organisations, thereby also enabling the development of better technology or enabling standardisation and technological compatibility; 
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tegic benefi ts that they sought. These include four broad benefi t types related to 13 different variables:
Benefi ts relating to fi nancial gains.
• Variables include (1) direct income from market transactions; (2) cost cutting, e.g. via savings on royalties or patent administration; (3) increasing the fi rm's ability to raise venture capital.
Benefi ts relating to innovation.
• Variables include (4) being able to use the best inventions, innovations and creative expressions; (5) setting common standards / making or using compatible technology or creative expressions; (6) innovation methodology: developing better technology or creative expressions; (7) benefi ting from user or supplier involvement as a development strategy. fi rms, UK fi rms in the ICT sector and UK universities 20 and refers to the sample of German fi rms.
In order to build the German pharmaceutical fi rms sample, information was drawn from the Amadeus database, which is a comprehensive, pan-European database containing fi nancial information on more than 11 million public and private companies in 41 European countries. Firms were extracted according to geographic location (Germany) and NACE Rev. 1 codes. The code used for this extraction was 244 (Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, med. chemicals, botanical prod.), which comprises codes 2441 (Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products) and 2442 (Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations).
From this initial population (size 746), it was established that 164 fi rms were not part of the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry (for example, pharmaceutical trading companies) and an additional 45 were no longer in business. Thus, the population was reduced to 537 relevant fi rms. All fi rms were contacted by telephone and offered the choice of either a telephone interview with the assistance of appropriately trained interviewers or an online questionnaire. The survey was carried out by Zentrum für Sozialforschung Halle e.V. (zsh), a company which belongs to the University of Halle. Field work was carried out between October and December 2008.
The questions in the survey referred separately to four IP marketplaces. In turn, for each marketplace, the questions in the survey referred to different IP governance structures, as detailed in Table 1. A fi rst set of questions referred to the extent and intensity with which fi rms participated in each marketplace and each governance structure. Firms were asked about their stock of patents owned and licensed, whether they engaged in each patent governance form, and if so, the number of transactions in the last two years. With respect to open source, non-patented technology and copyright, fi rms were asked whether they engaged in each governance form, and if so, the number of transactions they had carried out in the last two years.
A second set of questions referred to the benefi ts that fi rms seek when trading IP. For each marketplace and governance form, fi rms were asked to tick up to fi ve stra- Intellectual Property Rights seen in Table 2 , respondents are overrepresented in the large fi rms category and underrepresented in the small fi rms category. This is mainly due to the fact that small fi rms often reported that they were not formally and constantly engaged in product or process development and hence dealt with IP issues infrequently and sporadically.
We fi rst assess the patterns of participation in different IP marketplaces (RQ1).
Of the 34 respondents, 10 (29.4%) do not participate in any of the four IP marketplaces, while 24 (70.6%) participate in at least one IP marketplace. Of the respondents that participate in IP marketplaces, only 7 (29.2%) are involved in one marketplace, while most (17, that is 70.8%) are involved in two or more marketplaces (although no organisation participates in all four marketplaces: 10 fi rms do not participate in any marketplace, 7 participate in one, 13 participate in two, 4 participate in three, and none participate in all four marketplaces). Furthermore, while 4 fi rms (16.7%) engage only in proprietary IP marketplaces (patents and/or copyrights) and 9 fi rms (37.5%) engage only in non-proprietary IP marketplaces, the greatest share of respondents that engage in IP marketplaces use a combination of proprietary and non-proprietary forms of protection for their IP (11 fi rms, or 45.8%). This clearly indicates that participation in these marketplaces represents complementary rather than alternative strategies of knowledge protection and transfer. It is particularly interesting to fi nd that even in the pharmaceutical industry, which is considered one where the use of patents is particularly intensive and warranted, 21 the reliance on nonproprietary IP marketplaces is widespread. The reasons for the strategic use of different types of IP marketplaces (in terms of value seeking) are explored below.
Only two fi rms in our dataset participate in the proprietary copyright marketplace: one fi rm that also uses patents 
Benefi ts relating to the building of strategic relation-•
ships. Variables include (8) building informal relationships with industry networks; (9) increasing the fi rm's ability to enter collaborative agreements, e.g. joint ventures, strategic alliances etc.; (10) giving something to the community.
Benefi ts relating to market positioning. •
Variables include (11) increasing market share, e.g. building a broader user base or securing market protection; (12) professional recognition or brand recognition; (13) competitive signalling.
Then, fi rms were also asked to tick up to fi ve obstacles they encountered when trading IP. These include four broad types of obstacles related to 14 different variables:
Obstacles relating to search problems.
• Variables include (1) diffi culty in locating the owners of IP; (2) diffi culty in locating the users of IP; (3) diffi culty in fi nding the best IP.
Obstacles relating to a lack of transparency.
• Variables include (4) diffi culty in assessing the degree of novelty/ originality of the IP; (5) a lack of clarity of the IP document; (6) diffi culty in assessing the economic value of the IP.
Obstacles relating to contract negotiation and enforce-• ment. Variables include (7) diffi culty in negotiating a price for the IP; (8) diffi culty in negotiating the nonprice-related terms of the contract; (9) the excessive cost of enforcing the contract; (10) non-cost-related problems with enforcing the contract; (11) trust issues, e.g. opportunistic behaviour, free-riding, or similar.
Obstacles relating to excessive or too rigid regulation. •
Variables include (12) regulations allow overly exclusive rights; (13) international IP regulations do not fi t the needs of different local markets; (14) fi rms have different practices, which are not accommodated by regulations.
Analysis
Pharmaceutical Firms' Involvement in IP Marketplaces
The number of valid responses obtained was 34, resulting in a response rate of 6.3%. The low rate is mainly due to the fact that fi rms often reported either that they had outsourced the legal aspect of IPR to a specialised lawyer (who was not granted permission to answer our questions) or that they were affi liates of larger foreign investors who deal with IPR issues in their headquarters. As can be Table 3 summarises the responses given by pharmaceutical fi rms with respect to the benefi ts that they derive from engaging in the various IP marketplaces (the columns do not add up to 100% since each fi rm could choose more than one category of benefi ts). The 13 variables underpinning the four broad benefi ts in Table 3 are listed above in the data section.
23
Pharmaceutical fi rms seek all kinds of benefi ts in all marketplaces, but with varying degrees of intensity. The main benefi ts that fi rms seek when engaging in the patents marketplace relate to innovation and market positioning. This is in line with fi ndings from the economics of innovation literature, which point to the role of patents in the pharmaceutical industry as a means to prevent imitation and hence maintain market share 24 and with the conventional view that patent protection fosters innovation processes. 25 Firms that engage in open source pharmaceuticals mainly seek benefi ts relating to innovation and to the building of strategic relationships. This is also quite well known. The literature on open source has often indicated 23 In order to construct the shares presented in Table 3 , the fi rms' responses with respect to each benefi t were aggregated into the four main categories ("fi nancial", "innovation", "strategic relationships" and "market"), taking care to avoid double-counting. The shares of fi rms ticking at least one benefi t in each category were computed for each IP governance form, and they were then averaged across all governance forms within each marketplace. and one fi rm that also uses open source and non-patented technology. Because of the extremely low number of observations relating to this marketplace and its associated governance forms, we refrain from analysing the copyright marketplace throughout the rest of this article, focusing instead on patents, open source and non-patented technology.
The likelihood of participating in certain marketplaces or combinations of marketplaces is not signifi cantly affected by fi rm size. In particular, there are no signifi cant differences in terms of turnover or number of employees between the 14 fi rms that participate in patent marketplaces and those that do not or indeed between these subgroups and the structure of the full sample of 34 fi rms.
In the patent marketplace, all governance forms are used in almost equal measure, with a slight prevalence of inlicensing. Of the 14 fi rms that engage in the patent marketplace, most (13 or 93%) engage in in-licensing patents. Buying, selling, out-licensing and cross-licensing patents are each engaged in by 8 fi rms (57%), and 7 fi rms (50%) participate in patent pools. Of the 13 fi rms that in-license patents, 9 in-license from universities, while of the 8 that buy patents, 7 buy patents from universities. Universities are therefore a key source of patented knowledge for German pharmaceutical fi rms. The substantial impact that university knowledge has on the pharmaceutical industry is well documented. Of the 17 fi rms that engage in markets for non-patented technology, most seem to be active in many governance forms at the same time. 16 fi rms (94%) use non-patented technology, and there are 13 fi rms (76%) that are active in each of the following governance forms: releasing non-patented technology to the public, releasing non-patented technology to private fi rms, and collaborating with universities without patent restrictions.
In the previous two years, fi rms have, on average, traded about 10% of their total stock of patents. The stock of patents that fi rms in-license from other organisations is, on average, one third of the stock of patents they own. The number of patents traded in the previous two years is quite low: on average, fi rms have sold 0.5 patents, bought 1, out-licensed 1.4, in-licensed 2.7, and cross-licensed and pooled 0. 
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fi rms engaging in non-patented technology), although the use of non-proprietary IP is also relevant for increasing the fi rm's ability to raise venture capital.
With respect to innovation benefi ts, patents allow fi rms to develop better technology (27.6%), to use the best inventions (29.6%), and to a lesser extent, to benefi t from the involvement of users (16.7%). The same categories are also relevant in the other two IP marketplaces, although to a lesser extent. Instead, the most important benefi t for fi rms that exchange non-patented technology is making or using compatible technology (18.1%), which is generally not possible when fi rms protect their technology though patents.
Patents, open source IP and non-patented technology allow fi rms to increase their ability to enter collaborative agreements (around 17% of respondents in each marketplace). However, when fi rms exchange non-patented technology, they are mostly seeking to build relationships with industry networks (30.5%; this option is also important to 17.1% of the fi rms that exchange patents) and to give something to the community (23.6%).
Increasing market share is a key benefi t that fi rms seek when participating in the patent marketplace (seen as very important across all governance forms and for an average of 40% of the respondents that exchange patents). This is much less important in the non-proprietary IP marketplaces. In line with the results of other patent studies, 31 exclusive ownership or access to protected technology is regarded as very important for the fi rms' market positioning strategies. Nevertheless, contributing to innovation processes is the most important benefi t fi rms seek from the patent marketplace; this is consistent with the view that the acquisition and exchange of knowledge embedded in patents allows fi rms to acquire good-quality technology and to build upon it in social interaction processes.
32
Overall, two patterns stand out, even in the pharmaceutical sector, which has traditionally been considered one where the use of patents is widespread. First, participation in the patents marketplace is not the only way in which pharmaceutical fi rms foster their innovation processes: respondents also derive benefi ts for their own innovation activities from engaging in the open source and non-patented technology marketplaces. Second, innovation benefi ts are generally considered equally important 31 K. R i v e t t e and D. K l i n e , op. cit.; W. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets.., op. cit.; O. G r a n s t r a n d , op. cit. 32 R. M e r g e s and R. N e l s o n , on the complex economies..., op. cit.;
H.R. M e r g e s , R. N e l s o n : On limiting..., op. cit.; S. W i n t e r, op. cit.; A. P l a n t , op. cit.
that fi rms engage in open source IP in order to develop and use better innovations, 26 especially when user-driven. 27 The literature has also emphasised the importance of standardisation and compatibility, which allow fi rms to enlarge their user bases. 28 Firms have been known to contribute to open source projects out of individual extrinsic and social motivations, 29 especially when the technology is not crucial to the fi rm's competitive advantage. 30 However, fi rms that exchange non-patented technology mainly do so for fi nancial gain and in order to improve their innovation processes.
If we analyse in greater detail the respondents' answers with respect to the specifi c benefi ts within each category (these data are not reported), we fi nd that in the context of fi nancial benefi ts, "direct income" from the transaction is relevant only in the patent marketplace (and only for two patent governance forms, selling and out-licensing patents). This suggests that fi rms take part in IP marketplaces, proprietary and non-proprietary, for many reasons other than direct fi nancial gain. Cost-cutting is the most important fi nancial benefi t in all marketplaces (mentioned by 25% of fi rms engaging in open source and by 23.6% of Intellectual Property Rights the total number of benefi ts chosen in all marketplaces (that is, the index is the ratio between the share of benefi t i in marketplace j and the share of benefi t i in all marketplaces). This index allows us to compare the relative advantages of the various marketplaces, including open source, in allowing fi rms to achieve certain benefi ts. Overall, the RMAs show that German pharmaceutical fi rms seek fi nancial benefi ts primarily when they engage as certain other benefi ts, which differ by marketplace (for example, market positioning for the patent marketplace, building strategic relationships for the open source marketplace and fi nancial gain for the non-patented technology marketplace).
Building upon Andersen and Konzelmann, 33 we hypothesised that within each marketplace there is a link between the governance forms in which fi rms engage and the benefi ts that they seek. That is, benefi ts are not only marketspecifi c but also governance-specifi c.
In order to further deepen our understanding of the relationship between the use of different governance forms within each IP marketplace and the seeking of benefi ts, we have built an index which measures the extent to which organisations that take part in a certain governance form "specialise" in seeking a certain benefi t when compared with the overall set of organisations in the marketplace. Because this index is modelled upon the widely used Revealed Technological Advantage index, we refer to it as the index of "Revealed Governance Advantage" (RGA).
Let x ij be the number of times that benefi t i is chosen in governance form j, and ∑ i x ij the number of times that all benefi ts are chosen in governance form j; let ∑ j x ij be the number of times that benefi t i is chosen in all governance forms, and ∑ i ∑ j x ij the total number of benefi ts chosen in all governance forms (that is, the index is the ratio between the share of benefi t i in governance form j and the share of benefi t i in all governance forms). Then, for a certain governance form, the revealed governance advantage index is:
This index assumes only positive values: a value that is smaller than 1 indicates that governance form j is relatively under-specialised in benefi t i, while a value greater than 1 indicates that governance form j is relatively overspecialised in that particular benefi t.
The same index can also be computed for IP marketplaces, rather than governance forms. The "Revealed Marketplace Advantage" (RMA) index is computed as
where y ij is the number of times that benefi t i is chosen in marketplace j, ∑ i y ij is the number of times that all benefi ts are chosen in marketplace j, ∑ j y ij is the number of times that benefi t i is chosen in all marketplaces, and ∑ i ∑ j y ij is 33 B. A n d e r s e n , S. K o n z e l m a n n , op. cit. 
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The results in Table 5 show that benefi ts are quite specifi c to governance forms within each marketplace, with a few exceptions indicated in italics (market positioning benefi ts are similarly sought across most patent governance forms, and fi nance benefi ts are similarly sought across most non-patented technology governance forms). In all other cases, the standard deviation of the index is greater than its mean by more than 20%. Benefi ts are overall less specifi c to marketplaces than to governance forms, indicating that fi rms tend to seek all four categories of benefi ts in all marketplaces. Overall, with a couple of exceptions (which could be due to the somewhat low number of observations causing random disturbances), this confi rms that the hypothesis put forward by Andersen and Konzelmann 35 that governance structures matter for value creation processes in IP marketplaces holds for fi rms in the pharmaceutical sector.
Institutional Failures in IP Marketplaces
In the strategic use of different marketplaces, fi rms may encounter obstacles that prevent them from obtaining the value they seek (for an overview of these obstacles, see the beginning of this article and the literature review underpinning RQ4 above). In response to RQ4, we investigate the various types of obstacles encountered by fi rms which prevent them from achieving the value they seek when exchanging IP. Furthermore, we examine whether the obstacles are somehow inherent to certain marketplaces or to specifi c governance forms within each mar-35 B. A n d e r s e n , S. K o n z e l m a n n , op. cit.
in the non-patented technology marketplace, innovation and strategic relationships benefi ts when they engage in the open source marketplace and market positioning benefi ts primarily when they engage in the patent marketplace. However, the RGA results indicate a more complex pattern underpinning these overall results.
In the patent marketplace, fi rms seek primarily fi nancial benefi ts when they engage in the selling, out-licensing and cross-licensing of patents. Such benefi ts are least important when licensing university-owned patents. Firms seek primarily innovation benefi ts when they in-license patents, especially when they buy and in-license university-owned patents. This indicates that acquiring patents resulting from academic research is crucial for the innovation strategies of pharmaceutical fi rms. 34 Firms primarily seek to build strategic relationships when they out-license patents. Finally, market positioning benefi ts are particularly important to fi rms that buy patents, including academic ones originating from universities, and to those that participate in patent pools, indicating that acquiring access to exclusive technology is relevant to the fi rms' market positioning strategies.
In the non-patented technology marketplace, fi nancial benefi ts are particularly important when fi rms use nonpatented technology; this allows them to cut costs and to build strategic knowledge assets which in turn help them raise capital. Firms primarily derive innovation benefi ts from collaboration with universities, confi rming the important role of academic knowledge in fi rms' innovation processes. Firms primarily seek to build strategic relationships when they release non-patented technology either to the public or to private fi rms, while market positioning benefi ts are particularly sought when releasing technology to the public.
In order to quantify the extent to which a benefi t is specifi c to one or a few governance forms or whether it is equally sought in different governance forms, we compute the coeffi cient of variation of the RGA index across governance forms (σ RGA /μ RGA *100%); similarly, we quantify the extent to which a benefi t is specifi c to a certain marketplace by computing the coeffi cient of variation of the RMA index across marketplaces (σ RMA /μ RMA *100%). The higher the coeffi cient of variation, the more a certain benefi t is specifi c to one or few governance forms or to a marketplace, thus indicating a stronger revealed advantage. Intellectual Property Rights to assess the degree of novelty or the economic value of the technology and fi nd that the technology's description is not clear.
Investigating whether these obstacles affect fi rms in all IP marketplaces or governance structures to a similar extent or whether they are instead specifi c to certain ones should help us clarify which obstacles are considered particularly relevant in each context. Thus, we compute an index similar to the "revealed governance advantage" and "revealed marketplace advantage" indices mentioned earlier, only this time with respect to obstacles (Table 7) . Hence, we call them "revealed governance disadvantage (RGD)" and "revealed marketplace disadvantage (RMD)", respectively.
In the patent marketplace, contract negotiation and enforcement issues are particularly important, and they affect most forms of IP governance. Search issues are particularly problematic when cross-licensing and pooling patents. Transparency issues are problematic across the board, and regulation issues (having to do with the inability of regulations to accommodate different needs) are particularly relevant when in-licensing patents.
In the case of open source, search and regulation problems are particularly relevant. Search problems mostly relate to diffi culties in fi nding the best open source available, while regulation issues mostly concern the different practices of fi rms, which can fail to abide by the norms of open source development.
Firms primarily encounter contract-related obstacles when they release non-patented technology to the public. The rigidity of regulations is an issue when fi rms release non-patented technology to private fi rms and when they collaborate with universities.
Exchanging (patented and non-patented) IP with universities is very important for pharmaceutical fi rms' innovation processes, but it gives rise to many different obstacles.
ketplace. If this were the case, IP marketplaces would appear to suffer from certain kinds of "institutional failures", of which policymakers seeking to improve the smooth functioning of these institutions should be aware. Table 6 summarises the main obstacles that pharmaceutical fi rms encounter when engaging in various IP marketplaces (the columns do not add to 100% because fi rms could choose more than one category of obstacles). The 13 variables underpinning the four broad obstacles in Table 6 are listed above under the heading "Data".
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Firms encounter somewhat different obstacles in the different marketplaces.
In the patent marketplace, the most relevant obstacles are contract negotiation and enforcement issues and a lack of transparency. Lack of transparency most often derives from diffi culty in assessing the economic value of the patent (indicated by 49.5% of fi rms); the most diffi cult contract issues consistently concern the negotiation of a price for the patent (33.6%), but also the negotiation of the other terms of the contract (32.6%). Diffi culty in assessing the economic value of the patent is particularly high when buying (57.1%) and licensing (77.7%) university patents. In an analysis of patent licensing consistent with these results, Cockburn 37 found that the most important reason that patent negotiations break down is an inability to agree on the fi nancial and non-fi nancial aspects of the contract; a very high share of respondents also indicated "disagreement on basic facts or assumptions underlying valuation" as a major problem. In the non-patented technology marketplace, transparency is the biggest problem. 29.4% of respondents that engage in this marketplace fi nd it diffi cult to identify the best non-patented technology, while 15% fi nd it diffi cult 36 The fi rms' responses given with respect to each obstacle were aggregated into the four main categories ("search", "transparency", "contract negotiation and enforcement" and "regulation"), taking care to avoid double-counting. The shares of fi rms ticking at least one obstacle in each category were computed for each IP governance form, and they were then averaged across all governance forms within each marketplace. Intellectual Property Rights the case of both patents and non-patented technology forms (the standard deviation of the index is less than 20% of its mean). Search problems and regulation problems, however, are more specifi c to certain patent governance forms and also to certain non-patented technology governance forms. We also investigated the extent to which the obstacles that fi rms encounter in each marketplace are correlated to the benefi ts they seek, but we did not fi nd any strong patterns in this sense. This confi rms that obstacles are more related to the features of IP markets and IP governance structures than to the fi rms' individual objectives.
Conclusions
The analysis of the intensity, strategic motivations and obstacles to participation in different IP marketplaces on the part of a sample of German pharmaceutical fi rms sheds new light on the relationship between the fi rms' objectives when trading IP and their choice of marketplaces and governance forms.
Our results show that pharmaceutical fi rms participate in a variety of proprietary and non-proprietary marketplaces, which constitute complementary rather than competing methods of regulating and trading one's intellectual property. While most analyses on the exchange of IP in the pharmaceutical industry focus on the use of patents, our results show that non-proprietary marketplaces are used at least as intensively as proprietary ones and suggest that greater attention should be paid to them, especially by policymakers. Industrial and research policies based on the assumption This seems due to the excessive rigidity of IP regulations that render interaction diffi cult but also to the diffi culty in fi nding the best patents and non-patented technologies (indicating that universities' technology transfer offi ces need to improve their methods in revealing their IP to the market).
Finally, the coeffi cients of variation of the RGD and RMD indices allow us to assess the extent to which obstacles are specifi c to certain governance structures and marketplaces (Table 8) .
Transparency and contract design and enforcement issues tend to be similarly important across governance forms in Intellectual Property Rights derinvestment in knowledge production (which has been termed "the tragedy of the commons"), much less attention has been paid to the failure of institutions such as IPR to function effi ciently and smoothly. The results of our analysis show that fi rms encounter obstacles in all IP marketplaces. It cannot therefore be assumed that these markets function perfectly. Instead, interventions aimed at removing or easing such obstacles may be benefi cial.
In conclusion, the analysis confi rms that each IP marketplace is very different and their specifi c features must be considered in depth before broad IP policies are issued. Our results, which provide some evidence that both the strategic benefi ts sought and the market obstacles encountered are specifi c to individual IP marketplaces and usually also to individual IP governance structures within those marketplaces, indicate that each IP marketplace provides specifi c advantages and suffers from specifi c institutional failures. Therefore, policymakers wishing to improve the functioning of IP marketplaces for pharmaceutical fi rms should be aware of their specifi cities. For example, the use of patents may not be the answer for all types of value creation processes within pharmaceutical fi rms. Extending IP policies designed for one IP marketplace (namely the patent marketplace) to other forms of IP might well produce undesired effects, since the different marketplaces are used for different purposes and are characterised by different obstacles.
that pharmaceutical companies mostly trade their IP in the form of patents are in fact likely to be off the mark, as they ignore a large share of these companies' IP activities. Thus, the implementation of an IP policy focused solely on supporting and enforcing the patent system may have the effect of holding the value created using other forms of IP below its potential.
Also, the fi nding that pharmaceutical fi rms derive different strategic benefi ts from participation in different IP marketplaces (e.g. patent, open-source IP and non-patented technology) provides a counterargument to the mainstream view that only proprietary or patent protection allows fi rms to develop signifi cant value. For example, while still important, financial gains do not constitute the primary benefi t that fi rms seek from patents. This also explains why fi rms exchange patents despite the diffi culties that they encounter in terms of negotiating their price and assessing their economic value. The mainstream argument that patents are primarily important for value creation from ideas is put forward irrespective of IP governance structure. However, we fi nd that each type of IP employs different governance structures (e.g. with respect to patents, simple licensing out or in, cross-licensing, patent-pooling etc.) for seeking various kinds of benefi t.
Furthermore, while the generally accepted argument is that the public nature of knowledge can often lead to an un-
